Performance, Deservingness and Luck in Transfers

Link al seminario: https://loyola.webex.com/meet/rede3c

Abstract: In an online experiment we explore deservingness and giving in the Dictator Game when both dictators and receivers may or may not have undertaken a real effort task. We look at, whether dictator earnings are obtained through merit or luck, whether size of earnings, being a high performer, or political affiliation, amongst other things that impact giving. First, we do not replicate the result that earned entitlement significantly skews giving in the direction of the Nash prediction. We find no differences between treatments based on the whether the endowment was earned based on performance or luck. We find that perceived deservingness of receivers based on their effort and performance is affected by performance in the real effort task for the dictator. We find a negative relationship between size of earning and giving. Dictator own performance matters and giving is decreasing in it. Finally, high (above median) performers give less than low performers and  earned entitlement comes from the combination of having high performance and earning a high prize due to it. 

Asistencia presencial: Aula C2.03 Campus de Sevilla